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This paper uses data on house transactions in the state of Massachusetts over the last 20 years
to show that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of at least
one seller, are sold at lower prices than other houses. Foreclosure discounts are particularly large on
average at 27% of the value of a house. The pattern of death-related discounts suggests that they may
result from poor home maintenance by older sellers, while foreclosure discounts appear to be related
to the threat of vandalism in low-priced neighborhoods. After aggregating to the zipcode level and
controlling for regional price trends, the prices of forced sales are mean-reverting, while the prices
of unforced sales are close to a random walk. At the zipcode level, this suggests that unforced sales
take place at approximately ecient prices, while forced-sales prices reect time-varying illiquidity in
neighborhood housing markets. At a more local level, however, we nd that foreclosures that take
place within a quarter of a mile, and particularly within a tenth of a mile, of a house lower the price
at which it is sold. Our preferred estimate of this eect is that a foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles
lowers the price of a house by about 1%.1 Introduction
The market for housing diers in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset
market with exogenous fundamentals. This implies that the price at which a house is sold can
be inuenced not only by general supply and demand conditions, but also by idiosyncratic factors
including the urgency of the sale and the eects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of
the house.
First, houses are productive only when people are living in them. Owning an empty house is
equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a nancial asset. Second, houses are fragile assets that
need maintenance, and are vulnerable to vandalism. Unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable
and expensive to protect. Third, short-term rental contracts involve high transactions costs, resulting
from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage.
Fourth, houses are expensive, indivisible, and heterogeneous assets. Each house has certain unique
characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain potential buyers and not to others, so selling a
house requires matching it with an appropriate buyer. Because of the high costs of intermediation in
housing, this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer. Fifth, most
homeowners must nance their purchases using mortgages, collateralized debt contracts that transfer
home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults.
The expansion of mortgage credit earlier this decade and the recent decline in house prices have
led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006. Foreclosures transfer houses to nancial
institutions who must maintain and protect them until they can be sold. Foreclosed houses are likely
to sell at low prices, both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure
process, and because nancial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly. In a liquid market,
an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price, but the characteristics of housing
discussed above make the market for residential real estate a classic example of an illiquid market, in
which urgent sales lower prices.2
There is widespread concern that foreclosures may also lower the prices of nearby houses, either
through direct physical eects on neighborhoods or by creating an imbalance of demand and supply
in an illiquid neighborhood housing market. If such spillover eects on prices are important, they
might stimulate further foreclosures because homeowners are more likely to default when their houses
are worth less than the face value of their mortgages. See for example the motivation for the Obama
Administration's Making Home Aordable plan, as described on the US Treasury website: \In the
absence of decisive action, we risk an intensifying spiral in which lenders foreclose, pushing area home
2Mayer (1995) presents a theoretical model of this eect, assuming that an urgent sale is implemented using an
auction.
1prices still lower, reducing the value of household savings, and making it harder for all families to
renance. In some studies, foreclosure on a home has been found to reduce the prices of nearby
homes by as much as 9%." (US Treasury 2009.)
In this paper we seek to understand the illiquidity of the housing market, and specically the
eects of foreclosures on the prices of foreclosed houses and other houses in the same neighborhood.
We use a comprehensive dataset on individual house transactions in Massachusetts over the period
from 1987 through the rst quarter of 2009. Importantly, Massachusetts experienced a signicant
decline in house prices and wave of foreclosures during the early 1990s, which gives us a historical
precedent that can be used to shed light on the current condition of the housing market.
We study several categories of sales which plausibly are more urgent than normal. We rst link
data on house transactions in the state of Massachusetts, over the period 1987 to March 2009, to
information on deaths and bankruptcies of individuals. By matching names and addresses across
datasets, we are able to identify transactions as forced sales if they occur close in time to the death
or bankruptcy of at least one seller. We use hedonic regressions with neighborhood xed eects,
standard in the real estate literature, to control for heterogeneity in the characteristics of houses. We
nd that forced sales take place at price discounts of about 3-7%, and these discounts increase when
a house has one seller rather than two.
One concern about this nding is that it might reect unobserved eects of death or bankruptcy
on the quality of a house, in particular deferred maintenance by homeowners with health or nancial
problems. In order to explore this issue, we examine how discounts vary with the timing of sales in
relation to the seller's death or bankruptcy, we separate the deaths of younger and older sellers, we
distinguish housing types, and we relate discounts to the various components of a property's value.
We nd that death-related discounts are not closely related to the timing of a sale in relation to death,
are larger for older sellers, smaller for condominiums, and larger for houses whose structures account
for a larger fraction of their value. This evidence suggests that death-related discounts reect poor
maintenance of houses by older sellers, while bankruptcy-related discounts appear more closely related
to the urgency of sale immediately after bankruptcy.
Our main interest is in foreclosures. We nd large foreclosure discounts, about 27% on average.
These discounts are not highly sensitive to the type of housing, but they are larger for houses with
low-priced characteristics in low-priced neighborhoods. This suggests that the foreclosure discount
may be related to vandalism, through two possible channels. First, foreclosed houses may have been
damaged before they are sold. Second, mortgage lenders must protect foreclosed houses while they
are vacant; the threat of vandalism may be greater in bad neighborhoods, and costs of protection
likely account for a larger fraction of the value of a low-priced house. The costs of protection induce
2mortage lenders to sell foreclosed houses urgently, leading to discounts in illiquid housing markets.
The incidence of foreclosure sales is highly variable over time and space, but in some areas at
some times foreclosures account for a large fraction of total sales. This allows us to study the
relations between forced sales prices and the subsequent transactions prices of other houses in the
same neighborhood.
We contrast two extreme views of the relation between forced and unforced sales prices for houses.
The rst view is that unforced transactions take place at ecient prices, which evolve following a
random walk, while forced sales take place at lower prices. If the housing market were a dealer
market with a bid-ask spread, we could think of unforced transactions as revealing the ecient price
at the midpoint of the spread, while forced transactions reveal the lower bid price. If the bid-ask spread
is variable over time, then large discounts of forced from unforced sales prices should predict increases
in forced sales prices, but should have no implications for future prices of unforced transactions. That
is, bid-ask bounce (Roll 1984) aects the prices of forced sales but not those of unforced sales.
The opposite extreme view is that forced sales convey information about the future prices of
unforced transactions. There are several reasons why this might be the case. First, forced sales
may perform the function of price discovery, revealing the prices at which buyers are willing to enter
the market. Particularly in down markets, homeowners without urgent motives to sell may set
unrealistically high prices, perhaps because their expectations lag the market or because they use
their purchase price as a reference price (Genesove and Mayer 2001). In this situation, unforced
transactions may take place only when particularly enthusiastic buyers appear. If the housing market
had a bid-ask spread, we could think of forced transactions as revealing the ecient price at the
midpoint of the spread, while unforced transactions reveal the higher ask price. If the bid-ask spread
varies over time, a large discount of forced from unforced prices would predict declines in unforced
sales prices.
There could also be causal eects of forced sales on the general level of house prices. Forced sales
could absorb demand, reducing the prices of those houses that come to market later. Forced sales
could aect the reference prices that buyers and sellers use as \comparables" when they negotiate
prices. In the case of foreclosures, there is widespread concern that there may be direct negative
eects of foreclosures on neighborhoods. Foreclosures typically involve periods during which houses
stand empty, reducing the visual appeal and social cohesion of the neighborhood and encouraging
crime (Apgar, Duda, and Gorey 2005, Immergluck and Smith 2005, 2006).
Despite the plausibility of these concerns, we nd that at the zipcode level, the prices of forced
sales have relatively little predictive power for the prices of other transactions in the housing market.
The discount between urgent sales prices and other sales prices is stationary, so when it widens, it
3normally narrows again. But this primarily occurs through an increase in the prices of forced sales,
not through a decrease in the prices at which other transactions occur.
In order to detect spillover eects from forced sales to unforced sales, we look at foreclosures
that take place within a quarter of a mile, and within a tenth of a mile, of each transaction in our
dataset. At this highly local level, we do see evidence that foreclosures lower house prices, and
the eect is economically signicant during foreclosure waves. The extremely localized nature of
these spillover eects is consistent with results reported by Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2008) for
foreclosures, and by Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2008) for urban revitalization expenditures.
The spillover eects of foreclosures are persistent and, like the discounts on foreclosed houses, they are
larger in low-priced neighborhoods. Both results suggest that spillovers may reect physical damage
to neighborhoods.
The forced sale discounts we report in this paper are consistent with earlier ndings of illiquidity
in the housing market. There is evidence that certain seller characteristics inuence selling price and
time on the market in the same direction, as would be expected if an urgent desire to sell lowers the
price that a house fetches. Genesove and Mayer (1997) show that homeowners with larger mortgages
relative to their home values set higher asking prices, realize higher prices if they sell, but keep their
homes on the market longer than homeowners with smaller mortgages. More precisely, they nd
that a house with a loan-to-value ratio of 100% sells for 4% more but stays on the market 15% longer
than a house with a loan-to-value ratio of 80%. Levitt and Syverson (2008) show that realtors selling
their own houses get higher prices and keep their homes on the market longer than their clients do.
The price dierential is about 4%, and the time on the market dierential is about 10%, numbers
which are roughly comparable to those reported by Genesove and Mayer. Mayer (1998) studies real
estate auctions, which in the United States have been used primarily as a rapid sales mechanism by
developers and banks, and nds discounts of up to 9% in Los Angeles during a real estate boom, and
between 9% and 21% in Dallas during a real estate bust.
A related literature in corporate nance argues that assets with limited alternative uses appeal to
relatively few buyers and are correspondingly less valuable when they must be urgently sold. This af-
fects the debt contracts that can be used to nance such assets (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Benmelech,
Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) apply this insight to commercial real estate.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the procedures we
have used to clean it. Section 3 presents our hedonic regression methodology and uses it to estimate
the discounts of forced sales from unforced sales. This section also uses cross-sectional variation
in discounts to distinguish alternative interpretations. Section 4 studies the ability of forced and
unforced sales prices to predict future changes in house prices within the same zip codes, and more
4local spillover eects from foreclosures to house prices in the immediate neighborhood. Section 5
concludes.
2 House Price and Forced Sale Data
2.1 House prices
We begin with a dataset on changes in ownership of residential real estate, provided to us by the
Warren Group. The data cover the period 1987 to March 2009, and the entire state of Massachusetts.
The appendix to this paper (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 2010) shows the number of transactions
by zip code to illustrate the geographical coverage of the data.
The Warren Group data record basic characteristics of the houses involved in each transaction. In
almost all cases, the characteristics are measured as of August 2007; about 78,000 houses were added
to the dataset after this date and have characteristics measured later. Unfortunately, we do not have
a dynamic dataset tracking changes in house characteristics over time.3
The Warren Group data also record the sales price of each house and the names of buyers and
sellers. We have carefully cleaned the data to remove transactions that appear to be intra-family
transfers of ownership rather than arms-length transactions, and duplicate transactions that reect
intermediation or corrections of public records. The appendix describes our data cleaning procedures
in detail.
We remove outliers from the Warren Group data in several steps. We exclude transactions
in properties that cannot be classied as either single family, multifamily, or condominiums, and
transactions that take place at extreme prices, below the 1st or above the 99th percentile of the
distribution of raw prices. Where the dataset reports impossible property characteristics (for example,
zero rooms), we treat these characteristics as missing. Finally, we winsorize reported square footage
at the 1st and 99th percentiles and reported numbers of rooms at the 99th percentile. The resulting
dataset has 1,831,393 transactions.
The median house, across all transactions in all years, has 1,535 square feet of living area on a
9,452 square foot lot; it is 38 years old with 6 rooms, 3 bedrooms, and 2.0 bathrooms, and sells for a
nominal price of $180,000. The means of these characteristics are slightly higher than the medians,
indicating right skewness of the distribution, for all these characteristics. Full details on both house
and census tract characteristics are presented in appendix Table A.1.
3One might be concerned that inaccurately measured housing characteristics early in our sample period could aect
our results. However, in Tables A.6 and A.13 of the appendix we nd very similar results throughout our sample period.
52.2 Forced sales
In order to identify forced sales, we obtain data on deaths and bankruptcy lings from the Death
Master File of the Social Security Administration and Lexis/Nexis, respectively. These data give us
names, addresses, and dates which can be matched to the names and addresses of house sellers in the
Warren Group data. Many houses have two joint sellers, and we classify the sale as forced if we can
match the name of at least one of these sellers to a death or bankruptcy ling within three years of the
house sale. The Death Master File also gives us the ages of sellers, information that is not available
elsewhere in our dataset. Although our bankruptcy data include some corporate bankruptcy lings,
only personal bankruptcies end up matched to house sales.
The algorithm we use for name matching is described in detail in the online appendix. We match
based on last name, rst name, and zip code. We then use sensible priority rules, based on match
quality, middle initials, and event dates, to eliminate multiple matches.
We also identify forced sales related to foreclosures. Foreclosure proceedings typically begin after
homeowners miss about three payments and are unable to negotiate a solution with their lenders.
During this period, homeowners may be able to sell their property prior to actual foreclosure, but our
data do not allow us to identify these cases. The Warren Group data report transfers of ownership that
take place through foreclosure by demarcating the source of the transaction deed as foreclosure-related.
Massachusetts has both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. A judicial foreclosure is processed
through the courts, beginning with lender ling and recording a notice which includes the amount
of outstanding debt and reasons for foreclosure. Non-judicial foreclosures, in contrast, are processed
without court intervention, and the foreclosure requirements are established by state statutes. In
either case, with assistance from the local sheri's oce, the rst attempt at selling the property
is via an auction. The trustee or attorney handling the foreclosure sets the opening bid and this is
usually advertised in the foreclosure notice. The typical opening bid is the balance of the mortgage
plus penalties, unpaid interest, attorney fees, and other costs that the lender has incurred during the
process. In Massachusetts, the deposit to participate in the auction is usually $5,000 and homeowners
are not obligated to allow bidders to investigate inside the property.4
Since Massachusetts does not have a redemption period where a homeowner retains the right
to buy back the property by paying the full amount of the loan along with taxes, interest, and
penalties, the transfer of ownership becomes complete at a closing following the foreclosure auction.
The previous owners, if still present, are automatically converted to tenants, and the new owner must
4According to Massachusetts law, if there are two mortgages, the rst of which forces the foreclosure, and there is no
money left after the sale of the house to pay the second mortgage, the holder of the second mortgage still has a claim
against the borrower, but no further claim against the house. However, in the relatively unusual case where a second
lender forces foreclosure, the property is sold with a lien from the rst mortgage.
6follow Massachusetts legal procedures for eviction.5
Foreclosure auctions may be successful or unsuccessful. In a successful auction, the property is
sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to or exceeding the opening bid. Successful auctions
represent 18% of our cases. We identify these as cases where the acquirer is an individual or realty
trust, or takes out a mortgage to nance the purchase.
In an unsuccessful auction, nobody bids higher than the opening bid and control is handed over to
the lender. In this case, the lender is responsible for the sale of the property, and usually transfers the
property to its real estate owned (REO) department, which prepares it for sale typically on the open
market. Occasionally, REOs negotiate sales directly with investors rather than place the property
on the market, and can even oer purchasers packages of properties. For these 82% of cases in our
dataset, we treat the subsequent sale of the property by the mortgage lender as an urgent or forced
sale.
In cases where a sale is both foreclosure-related and linked to a death or bankruptcy, we retain the
foreclosure classication. If a sale is linked to both a death and a bankruptcy, we use priority rules,
based on match quality and event dates, to classify it as either death-related or bankruptcy-related.
The top panel of Table 1 reports the frequency of each type of forced sale for each year in our
data set. The rst column of the table shows the total number of housing transactions in the Warren
Group data in each year. We have just over 22 years of data and over 1.8 million transactions, for
an average of just over 82,000 transactions per year. Of these, 6.1% are forced transactions: 3.5%
related to foreclosures, 1.8% related to deaths, and 0.8% related to bankruptcies. The fraction of
forced sales is highly variable over time. At the beginning and end of the sample, this is partially
due to the matching process: we do not match deaths which happened before the start of our data
or bankruptcies which occurred more than three years before the start date of our bankruptcy data
in 1993. At the very end of the sample this is due to the fact that we cannot match sales to future
deaths or bankruptcies. More generally, it reects a gradual increase in death-related sales over
time, and an upward shift in the incidence of bankruptcy in the late 1990s and early 2000s before
bankruptcy reform increased the cost of personal bankruptcy in 2005.6 However the most important
time-variation is driven by two waves of foreclosures during the housing downturns of the early 1990s
and 2007-09. The incidence of foreclosure-related forced sales was negligible in 1987, rose to 9.7% in
1993, then receded to under 1% in the mid-2000's before rising again to reach a record level of 25.7%
in the rst quarter of 2009.
5This can run anywhere from 6 weeks to 6 months, with the average about 10 weeks
(http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/foreclosure.html, \Foreclosure FAQ").
6Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2008) suggest that the bankruptcy reform of 2005 contributed to the subsequent
increase in subprime mortgage defaults by making it harder for borrowers to achieve relief from unsecured debt obligations.
7The bottom panel of Table 1 categorizes forced sales according to the date of the death, bankruptcy,
or foreclosure in relation to the house sale. In the case of death, we nd that house sales within one year
of the death of a seller are more common than house sales two or three years before or after the death
of a seller; however sales are almost equally common the year before a seller's death and the year after.
In the case of bankruptcy, we nd that house sales are relatively rare during the three years before a
bankruptcy ling, but the sales incidence spikes up the year after the ling and then gradually declines.
For instance, 30.8% of bankruptcy related sales take place the year after the bankruptcy ling, while
only 9.5% take place the year before. The scarcity of sales before bankruptcy presumably reects
the fact that bankruptcy ling protects all but the most expensive primary residences from creditors
through the homestead exemption (White 2008). Foreclosure-related sales cannot occur before the
underlying foreclosure, and tend to take place rapidly thereafter. Of the 3.5% of foreclosure-related
sales in our overall dataset, 85.9% occur within one year, 9.1% in the second year, 1.6% in the third
year, and the remainder with a longer lag.
In the complete dataset, 65% of transactions are in single family houses, 11% in multi family houses,
and 24% in condominiums. Among forced sales, however, multi family houses are more common (20%)
and condominiums are less common (17%). The paper reports results both for the entire dataset, and
for separate subsamples for each housing type.
The city of Boston accounts for 8% of all sales and almost 10% of forced sales. Boston's modestly
greater share of forced sales is entirely caused by a higher incidence of foreclosures in Boston (13%
of foreclosures are in the city). Death- and bankruptcy-related sales are actually less common in
Boston than elsewhere. Figure 1 provides a richer picture of the geographic distribution of forced
sales, plotting by zip code the share of forced sales in total sales.
When we compare the distribution of house characteristics for forced sales, we nd that the median
forced sales price takes place at $123,000, which is only two thirds of the median sales price in our
overall dataset. This is true despite the fact that the median forced sale is of a similarly sized house
on a lot 79% of the size of the median sale.
At rst sight, the lower median price for forced sales suggests that these transactions take place at
a large price discount. However, one cannot reach this conclusion based on this simple comparison.
The incidence of forced sales was much greater in the early 1990s, when the overall level of prices was
depressed; and forced sales are more likely to take place in low-income minority neighborhoods, where
prices are likely to be lower for any given size of house.7 The next step in our analysis is to control
7Table A.3 in the appendix presents a comparison of house and neighborhood characteristics for forced sales relative to
our overall dataset. We also estimated models where house characteristics are functions of four forced indicators { young
death, old death, bankruptcy, and foreclosure{ and census tract-year xed eects (Table A.4). The regression estimates
indicate that forced sales tend to have between 0.10 and 0.19 more rooms than unforced sales, tend to be on smaller
8for these eects by using a hedonic regression.
3 The Forced Sale Discount
3.1 Static hedonic regression
Hedonic regression is a standard approach for estimating the relationship between the prices of houses
and their characteristics. Our main estimating equation for measuring the forced sales discount is
specied using equations such as the following for the log price, yist, of house i in census tract s in
year t:
yist = st + 0Xi + 0Fi + ist: (1)
Here, Fi represents measures of whether the transaction is classied as forced. For instance, in one
model, it is simply an indicator if the transaction is forced, while in another model it is a vector of
indicators corresponding to dierent types of forced sales. The terms st are census tract-year eects,
which allow for house price variation over time at the census tract level. All specications also include
month dummies to control for seasonality in the housing market. Xi is a vector of house characteristics
with coecient , and ist is an error term which reects random uctuation in house prices. The
standard errors are cluster-corrected at the census tract-year level.
If Fi were randomly assigned, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) would measure
the average causal eects of forced sales on transaction prices. Our set of controls Xi, which are fully
described in the appendix, is unusually rich; it includes interior area, lot area, numbers of rooms,
bedrooms, and bathrooms, the age of the house and its square, and dummies for recent renovation,
condominiums, and winsorization of characteristics. Nonetheless, there is still a concern that forced
indicators may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the house, biasing the OLS estimates.
This possibility cautions us against interpreting estimates of  as causal. However, we suspect that
unexpected forcing events such as sudden deaths are close to randomly assigned. Furthermore, if a
forcing event is correlated with unobserved changes in housing characteristics that lead to lower prices,
then our estimate may be interpreted as the total eect of the forced sale and the associated adverse
change in unobserved housing characteristics, a point we explore in further detail below.
Table 2 reports our estimates of  for three dierent specications for the forced sale variable. In
Panel A, the forced sale variable is an indicator if the transaction is forced. In Panel B, it is a vector
lots and tend to be older. To make a comparison between all characteristics in a parsimonious manner, in that table,
we also predict the log house price using our main hedonic regression model, equation (1), and regress this predicted
price on the four forced indicators in Column (8). We nd that sales that are forced by old deaths and foreclosures tend
to aect houses whose characteristics would normally make them slightly cheaper than average, by about 2% and 4%
respectively.
9of four indicators for deaths of young sellers (those who died under age 70), deaths of old sellers (those
who died at age 70 or above), bankruptcy-related transactions and foreclosures. In Panel C, these four
forced sale variables are interacted with dummies if there are one or two sellers. The estimates of ,
the coecients on house characteristics, are of less interest but we report them in appendix Table A.5
for the specication in Panel B. These coecients have the expected signs and plausible magnitudes.
The R2 statistics of the specications reported in Table 2 range from 0.72 to 0.82.
The rst column of Table 2 reports results for our full sample including all housing types. When we
use a single dummy for all categories of forced sales, we nd a large and precisely estimated coecient
of -0.197, corresponding to a price discount of 1   exp( 0:197) = 18%:
This eect is primarily driven by foreclosure-related sales. In Panel B, when we include separate
dummies for death-related sales by young and old sellers, bankruptcy-related sales, and foreclosure-
related sales, we nd coecients of -0.053, -0.069, -0.035, and -0.314, respectively. The coecient for
foreclosure implies a large price discount of 27%.
In Panel C, we look separately at transactions with a single seller and with two sellers. Again, the
rst column reports results for all housing types. We nd a much larger discount for death-related
sales when the house has a single seller than when it has two sellers. In the former case the discount
coecients are -0.083 and -0.097 for young and old sellers respectively, while in the latter case they
are -0.038 and -0.053. We also nd a considerably larger discount for bankruptcy-related sales when
there is only one seller (-0.064) than when there are two (-0.017).8
We have investigated the persistence of the forced sale discount by including information on the
price at which each house was previously sold. We rst identify the date of the most recent previous
sale of each house in our transactions dataset, the price of that previous sale, and whether the previous
sale was forced. We create dummy variables for previous sales that took place within the year before
the current sale, one to three years before the current sale, three to ve years before the current sale,
and ve years or more before the current sale. Then we interact the previous sales price, and dummies
indicating whether the previous sale was forced, with these dummies for the timing of the previous
sale. The estimates are presented in appendix Table A.10, which shows that previous sales prices do
have a persistent eect, which is almost invariant to the length of time since the last sale.9 Controlling
8We have explored how the estimate of the forced sales discount varies along other dimensions of our dataset. The
appendix reports estimates of models where the forced sale discount varies by year (Table A.6), by the timing of the
forcing event relative to the sale (Table A.7), by two subperiods 1987-1996 and 1997-2009 (Table A.8), and by geographical
location in Western and Eastern Massachusetts (Table A.9).
9The coecient on the previous sales price of about 0.15 implies that a 10% lower price at the time of the last sale,
unexplained by the other variables in the hedonic regression, is associated with a 1.4% lower price at the time of the
current sale. This persistent price eect, which is exploited by repeat-sales house price indexes (Case and Shiller 1987,
1989), could reect unmeasured quality dierentials across houses or the use of previous prices as reference prices in
bargaining by sellers and buyers.
10for the general persistence of house prices, we do not nd that forced sales have large dynamic eects.
Perhaps the most interesting result is that if the previous sale was death-related, there is a modest
positive eect on the subsequent sales price that roughly osets the persistent negative eect of the
death-related component of the previous sales price.
3.2 Interpreting the forced sale discount
A key challenge is to understand whether lower prices for forced sales reect illiquidity in the housing
market, or unobserved variation in fundamental characteristics of houses. For example, deaths are
more common among older sellers, whose houses may be poorly maintained or unfashionably decorated.
The fact that the death-related discount is increasing in the age of the seller suggests the relevance of
this point. Sellers in nancial diculty may also fail to maintain their houses properly, and houses
that have been foreclosed may have been vandalized while standing empty, or even in some cases
vandalized by their former owners.
To shed some light on this issue, we explore how the forced sale discount varies with the timing
of a sale in relation to death or bankruptcy, across housing types, and across houses whose value is
concentrated in the structure or the land.
Figure 2 shows that discounts for death-related sales are relatively insensitive to the timing of the
death, from 3 years before to 3 years after the sale. The somewhat larger estimate for transactions
before death possibly reects urgent sales driven by medical needs; however, when we include dummies
for death-related sales more than three years before or after the date of the death (which would not
be classied as forced sales), we nd that these also enter the regression signicantly. This conrms
the suspicion that much of the estimated price eect is not directly related to the urgency of the sale,
but results from unobserved poor maintenance.
The timing pattern for bankruptcy-related sales is more suggestive of a true forced-sale eect.
The largest coecient is for a sale that occurs within one year after a bankruptcy ling, and this
coecient, at -0.056, is more than twice as large as those estimated for the relatively infrequent sales
that occur before bankruptcy.
In the case of foreclosures (not shown in the gure) the timing pattern is U-shaped. The coecient
is -0.308 for foreclosure-related sales within one year of foreclosure, -0.428 for sales 1 to 2 years after
foreclosure, and -0.430 for sales 2 to 3 years after foreclosure. In the case of sales more than 3 years
after foreclosure, the coecient is -0.207. Since more than 85% of foreclosure-related sales occur
within a year of foreclosure, the deeper price discounts for the relatively small number of sales that
occur with a delay of a year or more may reect dicult market conditions that reduce the ability of
a lender to dispose of a foreclosed property in a timely manner.
11The right hand columns of Table 2 show how forced-sale discounts vary with housing type. Overall
and foreclosure-related discounts are larger for condominiums and multi-family houses, and smaller for
single-family houses. However, death-related discounts are largest for single-family houses, smaller
for multi-family houses, and very small for condominiums. Since a large part of the maintenance
of condominiums is handled collectively through the condominium association, and tenants in multi-
family housing enforce minimum maintenance standards, this pattern is also consistent with the view
that death-related discounts are related to poor home maintenance by older sellers.
To the extent that a forced sale discount reects poor maintenance of a house, then it should be
larger when the structure accounts for a greater share of the value of a property, and smaller when
the land and its associated building rights account for a greater share of value. In the extreme
case where a small house is sold in an expensive neighborhood as a \tear-down", there should be no
maintenance-related discount at all. Thus we can measure the importance of the maintenance eect
by looking at variation in the forced sale discount across houses with dierent hedonic characteristics.
In order to do this in a parsimonious manner, we follow a two-stage procedure. First, we estimate
equation (1), the static hedonic regression of Table 2, omitting forced-sale indicators. We decompose
the predicted log price of each house into components explained by the characteristics of the building,
the size of the lot, and the census tract-year interaction. Next, we regress the log price of each house
on the levels of these components, forced-sale indicators, and interactions between each of the forced-
sale indicators and each of the value components standardized to have zero mean and unit standard
deviation. The estimates are reported in Table 3.
The coecients on forced-sale indicators in Table 3 are very similar to those reported earlier in
Table 2. However there are some interesting interaction eects which imply larger or smaller discounts
for forced sales of houses with atypical characteristics. For death-related sales the price discounts
for all housing types, and for single-family houses, are larger when the building has greater value,
consistent with the idea that older sellers maintain their houses poorly. For bankruptcy-related sales,
the price discount is almost invariant to the value of the building, but is larger for houses in expensive
census tract-years. For foreclosures, the price discount is larger when the building is less valuable,
and is also larger for houses in low-priced census tract-years.
These results support the following broad interpretation of forced-sales discounts. Death-related
discounts appear to result primarily from poor maintenance of single-family houses by older sellers,
since the discounts are increasing in seller age, relatively insensitive to the timing of sales in relation
to death, large for single-family houses and very small for collectively maintained condominiums, and
greater for houses with more valuable structures. There may also be an additional liquidity eect due
to urgent medical expenses prior to death.
12Bankruptcy-related discounts are consistent with a true liquidity eect. Bankrupt sellers aim to
reduce their housing costs after bankruptcy, and the urgency of doing this is greater for houses in
expensive census tracts because these houses have higher implicit rental costs. Bankruptcy-related
discounts are higher for such houses, and higher when a house is sold the year after bankruptcy, but
relatively insensitive to housing type.
Foreclosure-related discounts appear to be related both to the urgency of sale, and to vandalism.
Foreclosed houses may have been vandalized during the transfer of ownership to mortgage lenders; and
lenders sell urgently both because empty houses deliver no housing services, and because it is expensive
to protect such houses against vandalism. Foreclosure-related discounts are larger in low-priced census
tracts, and larger for cheaper houses. This pattern may reect a greater threat of vandalism in bad
neighborhoods, and xed costs of protection that justify larger proportional discounts on cheaper
houses.
4 Forced Sales and Neighborhood House Prices
4.1 Zipcode-level price dynamics
In this section we ask how the incidence and prices of forced sales relate to the prices of unforced
sales. We begin by aggregating house prices to the zipcode-year level and examining the dynamics
of zipcode-level house prices. In each zipcode in each year, we weight each transaction equally and
calculate the average price of forced sales, the average price of unforced sales, and the share of forced
sales. Appendix Table A.11 reports summary statistics for this dataset. Unsurprisingly, we again
nd that forced sales take place at lower prices. The distribution of the forced-sales share is extremely
right-skewed, with a median of only 4% but a 99th percentile of 47%. We winsorize the fraction of
forced sales at this level.
Table 4 presents regressions that describe the dynamics of house prices at the zipcode level. Each
model has time and zipcode xed eects.
In a preliminary regression, not reported in the table, we make no distinction between between
forced and unforced sales prices. We regress price growth on lagged price growth and obtain a negative
coecient of about  0:43 with a standard error of 0:009, indicating that zipcode-level price variation is
mean-reverting. This result contrasts with the price momentum, or positive serial correlation of price
changes, observed in citywide, statewide, or national house price indexes (Case and Shiller, 1989).
The addition of lagged price growth leads to a modest improvement in the explanatory power of the
regression relative to a model with only time eects of about 11%.
Next we separate log forced and unforced sales prices, and estimate an error-correction model
13for the two of them. More specically, we estimate a rst-order vector autoregression (VAR) for
the change in log forced sales prices and the level of the forced sales discount, that is, the dierence
between log unforced and forced sales prices. This procedure is appropriate if the forced sales discount
is stationary, so that log forced and unforced sales prices are cointegrated (Campbell and Shiller 1987,
Engle and Granger 1987). The estimated VAR implies time-series behavior for the omitted variable,
in this case the log unforced sales price.10
We nd a strong tendency for reversal in forced sales price growth in Panel A of Table 4. Lagged
forced price changes predict forced price changes with a coecient of  0:07. In addition, a large
discount of forced sales prices from unforced prices predicts that forced sales prices will increase.
These two eects together explain an additional 38% of the variation in forced sales price growth
relative to a model with only time dummies. The forced sales discount is mean-reverting, with a
coecient of 0:07 on its own lag. The discount also has a coecient of 0:04 on lagged forced sales
price growth, implying that the discount is more likely to narrow if it reached its previous level through
a recent decline in forced sales prices; this is another manifestation of reversal in forced sales price
growth. The equations for these two variables imply only very modest predictability for unforced
sales prices, with negative coecients of  0:03 on lagged forced sales prices and  0:09 on the lagged
discount, and almost no improvement in the explanatory power relative to the model with only time
eects.
These VAR results imply that both forced and unforced sales prices move in such a way as to
narrow unusually large forced sales discounts. However, the additional explanatory power of the
regression is much greater for forced sales prices than for unforced sales prices. Zipcode averages of
unforced sales prices appear to be much closer to a random walk than are zipcode averages of forced
sales prices. This result supports the view that on average within each zipcode, unforced sales take
place at approximately ecient prices, while forced sale prices are mean-reverting because they reect
time-varying illiquidity in zipcode-level housing markets.
The variation over time in the incidence of forced sales allows us to ask whether zipcode-level
house price dynamics are aected by this incidence. In Panel B of Table 4, we add the share of forced
sales as a variable in the VAR system. We nd that the forced sales share is highly persistent, with
a coecient of 0:60 on its own lag, and that it depresses forced sales price growth (with a coecient
of  0:63) and widens the forced sales discount (with a coecient of 0:58). Once again, this VAR
implies very little predictability in the growth rate of unforced sales prices.
Finally, in Panel C, we consider the possibility that a high share of forced sales aects the dynamics
10If enough lags are included in the system, the implied dynamics are the same whether one omits the unforced or the
forced sales price. We obtain broadly consistent results if we estimate a VAR for the change in log unforced sales prices
and the level of the forced sales discount, including either one or two lags.
14of forced sales prices not only by directly predicting price changes, but by altering the coecients on
the other variables of the VAR system. We regress the forced sales share, the change in the log forced
sales price, and the forced sales discount on their own lags and the interaction of the lagged forced sales
share with the other two explanatory variables. We nd that a high forced sales share reduces the
tendency for forced sales price growth to reverse, and reduces the response of forced sales price growth
to the forced sales discount. Consistent with this, a high forced sales share increases the persistence
of the forced sales discount. The autoregressive coecient for the forced sales discount increases from
0.05, in an environment with an average 6% share of forced sales, to 0.28, in an environment with a
share of forced sales at the 47% winsorization point. In other words, a location with a high share of
forced sales is likely to have persistently depressed forced sales prices and high forced sales discounts.
In all these specications, we continue to nd that unforced sales price growth is hard to pre-
dict. For unforced sales price growth, even the rich model estimated in Panel C adds only 5.4% of
explanatory power to a model with only time dummies. The incremental explanatory power increases
modestly if we add additional VAR lags, but never exceeds 15% in any of the models we have esti-
mated. The limited predictability of zipcode-level house price movements, when sales are unforced,
is a robust result in our dataset.
4.2 Local eects of foreclosures
Even though forced sales do not seem to drive large predictable movements in average unforced
sales prices within the same zipcode, it is possible that there are more local eects of forced sales
on neighboring houses that do not show up in data aggregated to the zipcode level. A particular
concern is that houses vacated during the foreclosure process drive down neighborhood house prices.
In this section we use data on the precise location of each house transaction in our dataset to try to
identify such eects. Our main approach is to add variables to our hedonic regression that measure the
number of foreclosures, dened as cases in which ownership of neighboring houses has been transferred
to mortgage lenders, causing them to enter an urgent sales process. We nd considerable evidence
that foreclosures within 0.25 mile, and particularly within 0.1 mile, lower the price at which a house
can be sold.
A challenge in interpreting this result is that local economic shocks, such as plant closings, may
drive both house prices and foreclosures. Furthermore, foreclosures are endogenous to house prices
because homeowners are more likely to default if they have negative equity, which is more likely as
house prices fall. Ideally, we would like an instrument that inuences foreclosures but that does not
inuence house prices except through foreclosures; however, we have not been able to nd such an
instrument.
15Instead, we compare the eects of foreclosures before and after each home sale, and the eects
of extremely close foreclosures (under 0.1 mile from the target house) with those that occur further
away within the 0.25 mile radius. To the extent that common economic shocks aect house prices
and foreclosures within broad local areas, they should not create stronger eects of extremely local
foreclosures. To the extent that house prices drive foreclosures, low prices should precede foreclosures
rather than vice versa. For a foreclosure in census tract s in year t, our strategy compares average log
house prices for all houses that transacted after the foreclosure within a 0.25 mile radius to average
log house prices for all houses that transacted before the foreclosure. If there is a common shock
in the neighborhood which generates an overall downward trend within this micro-geography, it will
be captured by the dierence between these two groups. Our main assumption is that within this
small geography, a foreclosure should have dierential eects on the prices of houses that are within
even closer proximity. This is captured by the comparison of average log house prices for houses that
transacted before and after the foreclosure within 0.10 miles. The dierence between past and future
foreclosure coecients within 0.10 miles, controlling for past and future foreclosures within the far
radius, gives us the spillover estimate of foreclosures on nearby house prices.
To implement this approach, we enrich our earlier regression model by including measures of nearby
foreclosures as explanatory variables. Let Nk;l denote the number of foreclosures within geographic
region k 2 fclose;farg and time period l 2 fbefore;afterg. The models we report dene the geographic
radius for far and close to be 0.25 and 0.10 miles, respectively. Before refers to all transactions in the
year prior to the sale, while after refers to all transactions in the year following the sale. The appendix
reports estimates from a series of models where we vary these denitions. Let Dk;l be a vector where
each entry is the distance from sale i to the foreclosure.
The models we estimate are variations of the following:
yist = st+0Xi+0Fi+C;Bg(NC;B;DC;B)+C;Ag(NC;A;DC;A)+F;Bh(NF;B)+F;Ah(NF;A)+ist; (2)
where g() and h() are functions that allow us to parameterize the eects of multiple foreclosures.
For close, we report estimates where g() is a distance-weighted sum of foreclosures where the weight is
0:1 less the distance to the foreclosure in miles, divided by 0:1. This indicator gives a weight of 1 to a
foreclosure at the same location (which can occur in a condo complex), a weight of 0.5 to a foreclosure
0.05 miles or 88 yards away, and a weight of zero to a foreclosure 0.1 miles or 176 yards away. For
far, we let h() be the sum of the number of foreclosures within 0.25 miles and, hence, this does not
depend on the distance to each foreclosure.11 The estimated impact of a foreclosure on home values
11Appendix Table A.17 reports specications with alternate weighting functions including no weighting and shows
that estimates reported in Table 5 are largely insensitive to choice of weighting function for multiple foreclosures.
16at the same location as the foreclosure is given by the dierence C;B   C;A. Note that time here is
relative to the sale of the property, so we are interested in the dierence of estimates of foreclosures
before minus the estimate of foreclosures after the transaction, rather than the opposite.12
Because the distribution of foreclosures is extremely right-skewed, one concern is that a few outliers
dominate our estimates. We are, however, particularly interested in the eects of foreclosure waves on
house prices. To address this, the specication we report includes a piece-wise linear function where
the pieces are allowed to have dierent slopes between the 99th and 99.5th percentile, the 99.5th and
99.9th percentile, and above the 99.9th percentile. That is, we interact both the close (C;B and C;A)
and far (F;B and F;A) terms with indicators for these segments. The 99-99.5th percentile for close is
1.70-2.66 distance-weighted foreclosures, the 99.5-99.9th percentile is 2.66-7.33, and the 99.9 percentile
up to the maximum is 7.33-64. For far, the corresponding extreme values are 11-17, 17-31, and 31-74
respectively. 92% of our transactions have no foreclosures within 0.1 mile during the year before sale,
while 81% of our transactions have no foreclosures within 0.25 miles during the year before the sale.
As a result, the tail dummies include a meaningful fraction of cases with foreclosures. For example,
0.01/0.19 of 5.2% of transactions with foreclosures within 0.25 mile are above the 99th percentile of
the foreclosure distribution. The specication is such that, e.g., the estimate of 99:0 is the incremental
impact relative to the 99.0th percentile.13
Table 5 reports the estimates from this model with standard errors clustered at tract-year as before.
All previous controls are included (including the indicators for forced sales) but we report the values
of the various  estimates. The rst two columns only utilize information on the number of nearby
foreclosures before the sale of the house; they report C;B and F;B in equation (2), together with the
slope coecients for the extreme values.
In the second column, we also control for average prices of unforced sales within the 0.25 mile
radius during the previous year to allow for micro-level eects within this small neighborhood. We
calculate a weighted average of log prices (a geometric average price), using a linear weighting scheme
that gives a weight of 0.25 less the distance to the house in miles, divided by the sum of the weights.
By contrast with the local foreclosure indicator, this is a weighted average, not a weighted sum, so it
divides by the sum of the weights. We set the variable to zero in cases where no unforced transaction
has occurred within 0.25 miles during the previous year, and include a dummy for these cases.
In the third and fourth columns, we add information on the number of foreclosures after the sale
of the house and the average neighborhood house prices during the year after each transaction. If
unobserved local shocks drive both prices and foreclosures, or if foreclosures react to prices with a lag,
12Our strategy was inspired by Linden and Rocko (2008)'s study of the eect of sex oenders on house prices. Our
estimating equation reduces to their equation (2) when each foreclosure is an isolated event.
13The precise regression equations reported in Table 5 are described and explained in the appendix.
17we would expect that future foreclosures would have at least as much explanatory power for house
prices as lagged foreclosures. In columns (3) and (4) we report the dierence in the coecients and
the implied standard errors: the estimate of F;B  F;A is reported in the rst row of the table, while
the estimate of C;B   C;A is reported in the second row.
The rst two columns of Table 5 imply that recent neighborhood foreclosures are highly relevant
for predicting the price at which a house will sell. Each foreclosure within a 0.25 mile radius of a given
house lowers the predicted log price by 1.7% in column (1), or 1.1% in column (2) when we control
for the average level of recent unforced sales prices in the neighborhood. Foreclosures within a 0.1
mile radius are even stronger predictors, lowering the log price of a house by 8.7% if the foreclosure
is at zero distance, or 7.2% when we control for recent unforced sales prices, numbers close to those
claimed recently by the Obama Administration (US Treasury 2009). In the tail of the distribution the
magnitudes of these slope coecients decrease, implying that the overall eect of nearby foreclosures
is concave in the number of foreclosures. Nonetheless, this overall eect is extremely large in the
tails. A house in the top 0.1% of the distribution for both variables has a price forecast that is lower
by over 30% in column (1), or about 27% in column (2).14
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 show that recent foreclosures are stronger negative
predictors of house prices than are future foreclosures. The dierences between before and after
coecients, F;B   F;A and C;B   C;A, are consistently negative. The dierence C;B   C;A in
column (3) tells us that a foreclosure at zero distance lowers the price of a house by 2.0% more if
it took place within the past year than if it will take place within the next year, controlling for the
number of foreclosures within a 0.25 mile radius of the house. In column (4), we control for nearby
unforced sales prices and still obtain a dierence C;B   C;A of 1.7%. A typical foreclosure within
the 0.1 mile radius takes place at a distance of 0.05 miles; such a foreclosure gets a weight of 0.5 in
the nearby foreclosure index, implying a negative spillover eect of 1.0% in column (3), and 0.85% in
column (4).
What do these estimates imply about the eects of the current foreclosure wave? As a rough
calculation, we have studied the eects of the actual foreclosures that took place during 2008 on all
neighboring houses, whether or not these houses were actually sold. If we use the forecasting model
in column (2) of Table 5, the typical foreclosure during this period lowered the price of the foreclosed
house by $44,000 and the prices of neighboring houses by a total of $477,000, for a total loss in housing
value of $520,000. If we use the \dierence-in-dierence" estimate from column (4) of Table 5, the
typical foreclosure in 2008 lowered the price of the foreclosed house by $44,000 and the prices of
neighboring houses by a total of $148,000, for a total loss of $192,000. Even this considerably smaller
14This calculation follows, e.g., from (-0.087)*1.70 + (-0.055)(2.66 - 1.70) + (-0.037)(7.338 - 2.661) = -0.37 log points
or 31% in column (1).
18estimate implies that foreclosures have important negative eects on the prices of nearby houses.
We summarize several other results about spillovers, which are reported in the appendix. There
is little dierence between estimated spillovers if we only count unsuccessful foreclosure auctions in
measuring spillovers (Table A.12). The estimated spillover is larger using data from the rst half of
our sample, 1987-1996, than using only data from the second half, 1997-2009, though the dierence
is not statistically signicant (Table A.13). The estimated spillover is precise for both Eastern and
Western Massachusetts, but the point estimate is more than double in Eastern Massachusetts (Table
A.14).15
To investigate the role of lagged foreclosures on neighborhood house prices we enrich the speci-
cation in column (1) and (2) of Table 5 to add one further lagged year of our close and far foreclosure
measures. We nd that there there is a signicant eect of foreclosures that happened between one
and two years before a house is sold, an eect that is present even when we include controls for average
house prices within the 0.25 mile neighborhood (Table A.18). While these estimates do not control for
future foreclosures, their persistence suggests that foreclosures do not merely cause transitory liquidity
discounts on the prices of neighboring houses, but may have negative physical eects on neighbor-
hoods which last for some time. If this is the case, it adds credibility to the concern that foreclosures
reduce the ability of neighbors to renance their mortgages, and may even drive down neighbors'
home equity to the point at which they also have incentives to default. We also estimate spillovers
separately by housing type and value component (Table A.19). The largest estimated spillover is for
condominiums. There is also evidence that properties that are located in worse neighborhoods within
a census tract-year experience a larger negative spillover.
Finally, we use the same strategy to estimate the spillover eect of deaths and bankruptcies and for
unforced transactions. In contrast to foreclosures, we do not nd evidence for spillovers from either
deaths or bankruptcies (Table A.20) or from other unforced transactions (Table A.21). Relatedly,
we examine whether neighborhood foreclosures aect the discount at which forced transactions take
place (Table A.22.) The eects on bankruptcies and deaths are imprecise. However, we nd that
foreclosures within 0.25 mile of a house tend to increase the discount at which a foreclosed house is
sold relative to comparable unforced sales, consistent with our zipcode-level nding in Table 4, but
foreclosures within 0.1 mile tend to reduce that discount.16
Our results cannot be denitive on the causality from foreclosures to house prices, but the com-
15The appendix also includes various robustness checks on our specications including models with alternate denitions
for far and close, alternate denitions for before and after, and alternative schemes for weighting multiple foreclosures.
For all of these dimensions, the broad patterns are unchanged relative to Table 5. Interested readers can nd the
estimates in Tables A.15, Table A.16 and Table A.17.
16We also examined the sensitivity of the results in Table 5 to the inclusion of foreclosed transactions. When we
remove these transactions, the implied spillover is slightly larger than when they are included.
19bination of timing eects (stronger from lagged foreclosures than from future foreclosures) and geo-
graphical eects (stronger at extremely short distances) suggests that there is reason to be concerned
about spillovers from foreclosures to neighboring houses despite the reassuring zipcode-level results
reported in the previous subsection.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses data on more than 1.8 million house transactions in Massachusetts to show that
houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of at least one seller, are
sold at lower prices than other houses. The discount is particularly large for foreclosures, 27% of a
house's value on average. It is smaller for death-related sales at 5-7% of value, and smaller again for
bankruptcy-related sales at 3% of value.
The pricing pattern for death-related sales suggests that the discount may be due to poor mainte-
nance, because it does not depend sensitively on the timing of the sale relative to the timing of a seller's
death, is larger for deaths of older sellers, and is larger for houses where the structure accounts for a
greater fraction of the value of the property. The pricing pattern for foreclosures is quite dierent.
Foreclosure discounts are larger for low-priced properties in low-priced census tracts, which suggests
that foreclosing mortgage lenders face xed costs of homeownership, probably related to vandalism,
that induce them to accept absolute discounts that are proportionally larger for low-priced houses.
After aggregating to the zipcode-year level and controlling for movements in the overall level of
Massachusetts house prices, we nd that the prices of unforced transactions are close to a random walk,
while forced sales take place at a substantial and time-varying discount. This discount is larger and
more persistent when the share of forced sales is higher. These patterns suggest that most unforced
transactions in residential real estate take place at ecient prices, at least relative to the general level
of house prices in Massachusetts. Forced sales take place at lower prices, which one might think of as
revealing a \bid price" for houses as in the nance literature on the bid-ask spread in dealer markets
(e.g. Roll 1984). When many homeowners are selling urgently, the implied bid-ask spread widens for
housing.
We also look for evidence that forced sales have spillover eects on the prices of local unforced
sales. This question is of particular interest given the increase in the foreclosure rate in the current
housing downturn (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen 2007, Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles 2008). We
nd that foreclosures predict lower prices for houses located less than 0.25 mile, and particularly
less than 0.1 mile away. Although foreclosures and prices are both endogenous variables, the fact
that foreclosures lead prices at such short distances does reinforce the concern that foreclosures have
20negative external eects in the housing market. Our preferred estimate of the spillover eect suggests
that each foreclosure that takes place 0.05 miles away lowers the price of a house by about 1%.
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 Year Total Observations Deaths Bankruptcies Foreclosures Total Forced
1987 87,257 1.1% ‐ 0.0% 1.1%
1988 78,461 0.9% ‐ 0.0% 0.9%
1989 65,728 0.9% ‐ 0.3% 1.2%
1990 54,062 1.0% ‐ 1.1% 2.1%
1991 57,013 1.1% 0.1% 5.2% 6.4%
1992 68,471 1.2% 0.2% 8.2% 9.6%
1993 74,556 1.6% 0.3% 9.4% 11.4%
1994 81,058 1.8% 0.5% 8.3% 10.5%
1995 75,909 1.8% 0.6% 7.0% 9.3%
1996 84,046 1.6% 0.7% 4.9% 7.3%
1997 90,163 1.8% 0.8% 4.3% 6.9%
1998 99,770 1.9% 0.9% 3.0% 5.7%
1999 103,247 1.8% 1.1% 2.3% 5.2%
2000 95,036 1.9% 1.1% 1.8% 4.8%
2001 89,555 2.0% 1.2% 1.4% 4.5%
2002 92,582 2.2% 1.2% 1.2% 4.6%
2003 94,692 2.3% 1.4% 0.7% 4.5%
2004 105,630 2.5% 1.4% 0.7% 4.6%
2005 101,929 2.4% 1.3% 0.8% 4.5%
2006 86,243 2.3% 1.3% 1.6% 5.2%
2007 77,526 2.2% 0.9% 5.3% 8.4%
2008 60,483 1.9% 0.7% 14.0% 16.6%
2009(Q1) 7,976 2.1% 0.7% 25.7% 28.5%
Total 1,831,393 1.8% 0.8% 3.5% 6.1%




sale 1 yr after event 29.1% 30.8% 85.9%
sale 2 yrs after event 14.8% 22.1% 9.1%











which happen more than 3 years after the foreclosure.Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forced (‐3 years;+3 years) ‐ 0.197 (0.002) ‐0.159 (0.002) ‐0.236 (0.004) ‐0.224 (0.005)
Death, young seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.053 (0.005) ‐0.068 (0.006) ‐0.027 (0.014) ‐0.012 (0.012)
Death, old seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.069 (0.002) ‐0.082 (0.003) ‐0.062 (0.007) ‐0.017 (0.006)
Bankruptcy (‐3;+3)  ‐0.035 (0.003) ‐0.042 (0.003) ‐0.020 (0.008) ‐0.033 (0.007)
Foreclosure ‐0.314 (0.003) ‐0.260 (0.003) ‐0.344 (0.005) ‐0.308 (0.006)
One seller
  Death, young seller (‐3;+3)  ‐0.083 (0.010) ‐0.093 (0.012) ‐0.057 (0.026) 0.007 (0.018)
  Death, old seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.097 (0.004) ‐0.107 (0.005) ‐0.099 (0.013) ‐0.025 (0.011)
  Bankruptcy (‐3;+3)  ‐0.064 (0.005) ‐0.073 (0.006) ‐0.024 (0.012) ‐0.051 (0.010)
Two sellers
  Death, young seller (‐3;+3)  ‐0.038 (0.006) ‐0.056 (0.007) ‐0.009 (0.016) ‐0.022 (0.015)
  Death, old seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.053 (0.003) ‐0.070 (0.003) ‐0.041 (0.008) ‐0.013 (0.008)
  Bankruptcy (‐3;+3)  ‐0.017 (0.004) ‐0.025 (0.004) ‐0.016 (0.011) ‐0.014 (0.010)
Number of Observations
Table 2 ‐ Price Discount for Forced Sales









1,831,393 1,187,645 202,123 441,625Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Main forced sale effect 
   Death, young seller (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.055 (0.005) ‐0.070 (0.007) ‐0.023 (0.015) ‐0.007 (0.012)
   Death, old seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.071 (0.002) ‐0.090 (0.003) ‐0.062 (0.007) ‐0.016 (0.007)
   Bankruptcy (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.034 (0.003) ‐0.040 (0.004) ‐0.019 (0.010) ‐0.033 (0.007)
   Foreclosure ‐0.283 (0.003) ‐0.250 (0.003) ‐0.281 (0.005) ‐0.299 (0.007)
Forced sale effects interacted with building component
   Death, young seller (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.017 (0.007) ‐0.006 (0.008) 0.032 (0.017) 0.023 (0.012)
   Death, old seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.031 (0.004) ‐0.014 (0.004) 0.004 (0.008) ‐0.013 (0.008)
   Bankruptcy (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.007 (0.004) ‐0.003 (0.004) 0.007 (0.009) ‐0.001 (0.008)
   Foreclosure 0.041 (0.003) 0.039 (0.003) ‐0.007 (0.005) 0.035 (0.006)
Forced sale effects interacted with lotsize component
   Death, young seller (‐3;+3)  0.000 (0.006) ‐0.005 (0.006) 0.015 (0.016) ‐0.027 (0.015)
   Death, old seller (‐3;+3) 0.000 (0.003) ‐0.019 (0.003) 0.016 (0.007) 0.009 (0.011)
   Bankruptcy (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.006 (0.004) ‐0.011 (0.004) ‐0.014 (0.010) 0.003 (0.009)
   Foreclosure ‐0.008 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.017 (0.005) ‐0.014 (0.007)
Forced sale effects interacted with tract‐year component
   Death, young seller (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.011 (0.006) ‐0.005 (0.006) ‐0.013 (0.018) ‐0.026 (0.013)
   Death, old seller (‐3;+3) ‐0.004 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) ‐0.006 (0.008) ‐0.018 (0.007)
   Bankruptcy (‐3;+3) ‐ 0.023 (0.004) ‐0.021 (0.004) ‐0.015 (0.011) ‐0.006 (0.009)







Full sample Single Family Multi Family CondominiumEstimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δpft‐1 ‐‐‐ 0.072 (0.012) 0.038 (0.012) ‐0.033 (0.004)
put‐1‐pft‐1 ‐‐ 0.840 (0.016) 0.067 (0.016) ‐0.093 (0.006)
Δ Adj R
2
sft‐1 0.596 (0.012) ‐0.633 (0.070) 0.575 (0.070) ‐0.057 (0.027)
Δpft‐1 ‐0.004 (0.002) ‐0.067 (0.012) 0.034 (0.012) ‐0.033 (0.004)
put‐1‐pft‐1 0.006 (0.003) 0.857 (0.016) 0.051 (0.016) ‐0.092 (0.006)
Δ Adj R
2
sft‐1 0.548 (0.016) 0.166 (0.097) 0.320 (0.098) 0.486 (0.037)
Δpft‐1 0.011 (0.003) ‐0.044 (0.015) 0.041 (0.015) ‐0.003 (0.006)
put‐1‐pft‐1 0.007 (0.003) 0.984 (0.020) 0.018 (0.020) 0.002 (0.008)
sft‐1 x Δpft‐1 ‐0.263 (0.026) ‐0.082 (0.153) ‐0.202 (0.154) ‐0.284 (0.057)


















sft Δpft put‐pft Δput
0.016 0.144 0.384(1) (2) (3) (4)
Slope: far (δF) ‐0.017 ‐0.011 ‐0.006 ‐0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Slope: close (δC) ‐0.087 ‐0.072 ‐0.020 ‐0.017
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Outlier controls:
   Slope at 99.0: far (δF
99.0) 0.002 ‐0.000 ‐0.011 ‐0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
   Slope at 99.0: close (δC
99.0) ‐0.055 ‐0.050 ‐0.048 ‐0.043
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014)
   Slope at 99.5: far (δF
99.5) ‐0.004 ‐0.003 ‐0.008 ‐0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
   Slope at 99.5: close (δC
99.5) ‐0.037 ‐0.030 ‐0.031 ‐0.027
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008)
   Slope at 99.9: far (δF
99.9) ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
   Slope at 99.9: close (δC
99.9) ‐0.009 ‐0.005 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Additional controls:
   Average price, before 0.248 0.180
(0.002) (0.002)
   Average price, after 0.184
(0.002)
   No transaction before indicator 2.992 2.168
(0.028) (0.022)
   No transaction after indicator 2.244
(0.022)
Table 5 ‐ Spillover Estimates of Foreclosures
Notes:  table reports estimates and standard errors, in parenthesis, from regressions of log price on the unweighted number of foreclosures in the 
0.25mi area around the house sold (variable far), and the linearly weighted number of foreclosures in the 0.1mi area (variable   close), for the year 
before and after the sale. The effect is specified as piecewise linear in the intervals (0‐99th pct), (99th‐99.5th), (99.5th‐99.9th), (99.9th‐max), with the 
estimated coefficients reported. Columns (1) and (2) are models which only use foreclosures that happened before each sale.  The reported estimates 
are the slope coefficients of each part of the piece‐wise linear function.  Columns (3) and (4) include the foreclosures before and after the sale.  The 
reported estimates are the difference in the estimates for each piece of the piece‐wise linear function, between the effect of foreclosures before and 
after the transaction. Columns (2) and (4) also include the distance‐weighted average log price of neighboring houses (0.25mi), in the year before and 
after the sale, and an indicator for the cases where there are no transactions in the neighborhood, in that time frame.  Each model includes the house
and forced sale characteristics of Table 2, Panel B. The cutoff points in the piece‐wise linear function for close are: 1.696 (99th percentile), 2.661 (99.5 
percentile), and 7.338 (99.9th percentile).  For the far variable, the cutoff points are: 11 (99th percentile), 17 (99.5th percentile), and 31 (99.9th 
percentile).  Standard errors are clustered at the census tract‐year level.
Estimated Difference in Coefficients: Using only Foreclosures Before Transaction:
Before [δF,B and δC,B] Before ‐ After [(δF,B ‐ δF,A) and (δC,B ‐ δC,A)]